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INTRODUCTION

Real estate "earnest money" and "option" contracts1 have evolved,
in recent years, into highly speculative investment mediums, offering
the buyer an opportunity for quick profit, while presenting him little,
if any, financial risk. A purchaser, having obtained the right to
purchase desirable property, may often make a substantial profit by
selling his rights under the contract or, immediately upon closing his
purchase, by selling the property under the contract. The use of these
contracts not only reflects the speculator's desire to benefit from the
employment of arbitrage in a market engendering rapidly escalating
real estate values, but also reflects the heightened importance of due
diligence reviews by purchasers and their attorneys, conducted to determine whether to purchase property. The use of the earnest money
purchase contract is also partly attributable to recent profound
1. Many members of the business and legal real estate community commonly use the
term "earnest money contract" to refer to any agreement whereby a party either has entered
into a binding contract to purchase property and has deposited earnest money pursuant
thereto, or a contract under which the purchaser has an option if it chooses to purchase the
property. While the legal characteristics and distinctions of "earnest money" and "option"
contracts will be examined in this article, both of these forms of contract, unless otherwise
noted herein, will be referred to collectively as contracts.
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changes occurring in the American economy and real estate development industry.2
The presently existing confluence of highly volatile interest rates,
the frequent shortages of favorable traditional long term permanent
financing, and the increase in the number and scope of municipal,
state, and federal legal requirements and regulations affecting real estate development 3 make it difficult for even experienced and success2. The following list of articles illustrates various changes which have occurred in the
economy and real estate development industry, as well as indicating the interest and attention
which these changes have engendered: Bernick, Real Estate Write Off Change Approved by
FinanceAmidst Disagreements Within Industry, 23 TAx NOTES 117 (1984); Blumenthal, Effect
of New Original Issue Discount Rules on Real Estate Syndications, 14 TAX ADVISOR 594
(1983); Goldberg, An Analysis of the New Temporary Rules on Reporting Foreign Investments
in United States Realty, 58 J. TAX'N 258 (1983); Joyce, Governmental Issues Related to Real
Estate Development, 11 COLO. LAW. 2527 (1982); Kelly, Fiduciary Duties Related to Pension
Fund Investment in Real Estate, 14 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 253 (1983); Kuklin, Impetus to an
Industry---The Effect of Taxation of Real Estate and Real Estate Derived Income on Real
Property Development in the United States, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 458 (1982); 1982

Legislation Affecting Real Property, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 244 (1983); Malloy, The
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. Its Requirements, Consequences, and Implications
For Persons Participatingin Real Estate Development, 24 B.C.L. REv. 1187 (1983); Peretz,
Rescission Under the Interstate Land Sales Full DisclosureAct, 58 FLA. B.J. 297 (1984); Roberts, Uniform Condominium Act-New Flexibility For Developers, 40 J. Mo. B. 177 (1984);
Solomon, The Section 1031 Exchange of Real Estate-HasACRS DecreasedIts Attractiveness?,
10 J. REAL EST. TAX'N. 346 (1983); Tucker, How TEFRA Affects Real Estate Investments:
Analyzing Direct and Indirect Consequences, 58 J. TAX'N 66 (1983); Comment, Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate: Congress Acts to Reduce Incentives, 7 INT'L. TRADE L.J.
150 (1981-1982).
3. One of the most time consuming and expensive aspects of preparing real property for
development and ultimate sale in today's real estate market is the burden of adherence to the
many local, state, and federal regulation and disclosure requirements. Compliance with these
regulations is quite often necessary prior to the developer's first sale. For example, the development of a residential subdivision, condominium project, or office park could easily involve
compliance with one or more federal or state laws. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2602(1), 2603(a) (1983) (containing statement of purpose, definitions
of federally related mortgages, and uniform settlement form and procedure for federally related mortgages); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1983) (declaring unfair
methods of competition unlawful, defining penalties for violations, etc.); Truth in Lending
Simplification and Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1983) (laws concerning disclosure,
finance charges, annual percentage rates, enforcement, criminal liability, credit transaction requirements, credit advertising, etc.); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16911691(F) (1983) (regarding credit discrimination, enforcement, application of state property
laws, civil liability, etc.); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720
(1983) (includes exemptions, requirements regarding sale or lease of lots, subdivision registration, certification of states requiring disclosure substantially equivalent to federal requirements,
penalties, liability, etc.); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301(1), 2302(a) (1983) (warranty requirements with regard to consumer products);
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1983) (regarding discrimination in sale,

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:541

ful developers to irrevocably commit themselves to acquire property.
The main reason for this difficulty is that such commitments could
readily prove burdensome in the absence of satisfactory financing or
the achieving of various approvals necessary to develop and market
the targeted property.
To facilitate the developer's opportunity to tie up property with little or no money, whether it be to "flip" the property to an eager purchaser during a hot market, or for holding the property while the
developer secures necessary financing or investigates whether the
property can be developed economically and within prescribed time
frames, attorneys in Texas and around the country have necesssarily
shifted the legal import of the form of contract typically employed in
real estate transactions. In previous times, when the real estate market was more stable and less subject to the volatility of the economy,
the typical contract was an agreement that clearly bound the seller to
sell the property and the purchaser to purchase the property. Today,
however, the typical contract is an agreement whereby the seller is
absolutely obligated to sell the property at a price certain on a specified date, but the purchaser's obligation to buy is less than absolute
because it is subject to, or contingent upon, the fulfillment of various
conditions. Conditions commonly found in this type of contract include the purchaser being satisfied as to the condition of title to the
property, the availability of suitable financing, and suitable or desired
zoning; these and other conditions frequently entail subjective judgment by the purchaser as to their satisfactory fulfillment. Furthermore, these contracts often provide that even should these conditions
to closing be satisfactorily met, if the purchaser does not close the
transaction, the seller is limited solely to the collection of earnest
money as liquidated damages.4

rental, financing of housing, enforcement, penalties, etc.); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.41-17.61, 27.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1984) (Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Real
Estate Fraud provisions).
4. The foregoing described purchaser-oriented contract provisions are generally not
found in the current forms of contracts promulgated by the State Bar of Texas, or in the
various local Board of Realtor forms commonly used by real estate brokers or attorneys who
only occasionally prepare sales contracts. See LEGAL FORMS COMMITTEE OF THE STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, LEGAL FORM MANUAL FOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 2.2A, 2.15-2.26

(1982); Commercial EarnestMoney Contract, EL PASO BOARD OF REALTORS (n.d); Commercial-IndustrialSales Contract, GREATER FORT WORTH BOARD OF REALTORS, INC. (1983);
Commercial Property-Real Estate Sales Agreement, SAN ANTONIO BOARD OF REALTORS,
INC. (n.d); Contract of Sale-Nonresidential,GREATER DALLAS BOARD OF REALTORS, INC.
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The real estate industry and the attorneys representing the industry
have both accepted and adopted the nature and use of such purchaser-oriented contracts. Recent cases, however, illustrate that
many attorneys in Texas have forgotten, or are unaware of, the necessary elements to create a binding and enforceable "earnest money" or
"option" contract. These cases also serve to underscore the important
differences arising from the distinctions drawn by Texas courts regarding the legal import of the character of the purchaser's and
seller's obligations under either of these forms of contracts. Furthermore, it is clear that, while the real estate bar continues to create more
sophisticated contracts to grant its developer and investor clients
great latitude in deciding whether to go forward with a pending sale, a
failure by a developer's attorney to recognize established Texas case
law could result in his client losing the right to refuse to consummate
a transaction that the client mistakenly believed he was under no obligation to close. Furthermore, as is indicated by a recent case, failure
to fully understand the obligations created by particular types of contracts may result in a purchaser losing his right to require the consummation of the sale.5
The agreement to acquire real estate, whether it is an "earnest
money" or "option" contract, is one of the most fundamental documents prepared and reviewed by the real estate practitioner. Recognizing the economic opportunity and the due diligence benefits of the
purchaser-oriented contract, this article will analyze the elements necessary to create either an earnest money or option contract and will
review the traditional and recent cases that distinguish the two forms
of contracts. In addition, this article will place special emphasis on
factual circumstances and contract language that the courts have re(1981) (a copy of these contracts may be found at each of these offices). A review of these
contracts reveals a bilateral agreement whereby seller and purchaser agree respectively to sell
and purchase property. However, it has been the authors' observations that most attorneys
who routinely represent developers employ, as a matter of course, contracts containing purchaser-oriented contract provisions. An examination of the various articles and materials from

the more recent continuing legal education courses in Texas will provide excellent examples of
typical approaches used by practitioners representing developers and speculators. See Heath,
Land Acquisition Foran Income ProducingProject, STATE BAR OF TEXAS-ADVANCED REAL
ESTATE LAW COURSE, at F-1 (1979); Schlanger, Sale and Purchase of Income Producing
Properties, STATE BAR OF TEXAS-ADVANCED REAL ESTATE LAW COURSE, at P-I (1980);

Wallenstein, Acquisitions and Dispositions of Income-Producing Properties,

STATE BAR OF

at B-I (1983).
5. See Hott v. Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).

TEXAS-ADVANCED REAL ESTATE LAW COURSE,

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 3, Art. 3

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:541

lied on to distinguish these agreements. Finally, this article will offer
drafting considerations and suggestions to help ensure that one's client can use the contract as a medium to acquire, flip, or develop the
property with little or no money invested, while still retaining great
discretion in deciding whether or not to consummate its purchase
pursuant to the contract.
II.

OPTION AND CONTRACT OF SALE DEFINED

The courts have adopted varying definitions or tests to determine
the existence of an option. In general, the courts have declared that
the distinction between an absolute contract of sale and an option is
dependent upon the intention of the parties rather than the nomenclature they have employed. 6 This general principle is of limited use to
the practitioner, but, fortunately, the courts have adopted various criteria by which the existence and nature of such intent may be determined. 7 An option to purchase real property is a unilateral contract
6. See, e.g., Broady v. Mitchell, 572 S.W.2d 36, 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where contract language obligates seller to accept liquidated damages
as sole remedy, agreement is option); Smith v. Hues, 540 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (mandatory obligation to receive liquidated damages shows intent to have option contract); Tabor v. Ragle, 526 S.W.2d 670, 676 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court in Ragle stated that, in order for a
contract to be considered an option, the contract must require that the vendor accept liquidated damages as his sole remedy. Although the provision in the contract allowing the vendor
to seek specific performance had been deleted, the court allowed other evidence to show that
the intent of the parties was not that the vendor's sole remedy would be liquidated damages.
See id. at 676.
7. One line of cases has held that contracts which did not bind the second party to
purchase were mere option contracts. See, e.g., White v. Bank of Hanford, 83 P. 698, 698 (Cal.
1906) (contract stated: "White has an option of purchase ... for the sum of $10,200 to be
paid as follows,. . . $250 cash down, the balance.

if said sum is not paid

. . .

. .

on or before August the 15th, 1903 and

then the above sum to be forfeited."); Black v. Maddox, 30 S.E.

723, 724 (Ga. 1898) ("in case the balance ...

is not paid

. . .

this agreement to be null and

void and the money paid thereon to be considered as forfeited . . . as liquidated damages");
Swank v. Fretts, 59 A. 264, 264 (Pa. 1904) (language stated that "[a] failure of second party to
make first payment within fifty days from above date shall render this agreement null and
void"); Runck v. Dimmick, Ill S.W. 779, 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (language stated
that " 'he will comply with the above conditions within thirty days or forfeit the earnest
money' "). Other cases, however, have held that the mere fact that the contract does not
formally bind a party to make payment is not conclusive of its character. See, e.g., Griffith v.
Bradford, 138 S.W. 1072, 1073 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1911, no writ) (contract did not
expressly bind purchaser, yet court held obligation to be implied); Newton v. Dickson, 116
S.W. 143, 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ) (despite language stating that failure of either
party to perform would result in forfeit of deposit, contract was not an option). An agreement
to purchase has been implied from the fact that a person has subscribed his name to the con-
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pursuant to which a right to purchase property at a certain price, on
specified terms, and within a stated time is conferred on another by
the owner." In contrast, a contract for the sale of real property is an
executory bilateral contract which binds the seller to sell and the
buyer to buy specified property according to the terms of the contract,

including the purchaser's unconditional obligation to pay the
purchase price. The purpose of each of the parties to a contract of
sale is to obligate the other party to perform and not merely to provide for one party to have an option between performance and nonperformance. 9 On the other hand, an option is an offer which is
tract, or where the evidence expressly declares both parties' purpose is to enter into a contract.
See Heath v. Huffhines, 152 S.W. 176, 177-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1912, no writ).
An agreement which allows the purchaser to withdraw from the contract without suffering any
loss beyond forfeiture of his deposit will most often be considered an option. See Slade &
Bassett v. Crum, 193 S.W. 723, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1917, no writ) (contract which
stated "[iun default in payment of either of said amounts said Crudington is to forfeit to me the
$2,000.00 heretofore paid" held to be option). Where the contract calls for forfeiture of the
purchaser's deposit or initial payment because of noncompliance with the conditions of the
sale, the contract is not rendered an option if the purpose for the forfeiture provision is to give
the seller the option of accepting the deposit as damages, or the right to insist on the buyer's
performance. See Hamburger & Dreyling v. Thomas, 118 S.W. 770, 773 (Tex. Civ. App.
1909), affd, 103 Tex. 280, 126 S.W. 561 (1910).
8. See Lefevere v. Sears, 629 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ); White
v. Miller, 518 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. Civ, App.-Tyler, 1974, writ dism'd); State v. Clevenger,
384 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A relatively old case,
Ide v. Leiser, 24 P. 695 (Mont. 1890), indicates that the principle underlying judicial construction of option contacts have remained basically the same for a long period of time. The court
in Ide stated that:
[A]n option, originally, is neither simply a contract by which the owner of property (real
estate being the species we are now discussing) agrees with another person that he shall
have the right to buy his property, at a fixed price, within a time certain. He does not sell
his land; he does not then agree to sell it; but he does then sell something, viz., the right or
privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. The second party gets, in
praesenti, not lands, or an agreement that he shall have lands, but he does get something
of value; that is the right to call for and receive lands if he elects. The owner parts with
his right to sell his lands, except to the second party, for a limited period. The second
party receives this right, or rather, from his point of view, he receives the right to elect to
buy.
Id. at 695.
9. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wilkinson, 148 P. 177, 179 (Okla. 1915) (agreement of sale and
purchase binds parties); Carroll v. Wied, 572 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, no writ) (contract of sale obligates respective parties to buy and sell); Collier v. Robinson, 129 S.W. 389, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-1910, writ ref'd) (contract binding parties to sell and
purchase is contract of sale). Although an agreement may provide for forfeiture of purchase
money partially paid if the remaining portion of the purchase price is not paid by a certain
date, it is not an option where the parties expressly provide that the purchaser is obligated to
purchase despite the forfeiture. See Heman v. Wade, 41 S.W. 740, 742 (Mo. 1897); Newton v.
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irrevocable for a period of time during which the prospective purchaser may, but is not obligated to, accept the offer and become
bound to purchase the property. The option thus constitutes a promise by the property owner to sell his land to the purchaser if, within
the option period, the purchaser accepts the offer in the manner
prescribed.10
In order for the option to be irrevocable for the period designated,
the option must be supported by consideration independent of the
purchase price itself.11 In other words, the optionee must furnish conDickson, 116 S.W. 143, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-1909, no writ). The Newton court held that the
following language constituted a binding contract and not a mere option: "and to bind the
above contract, we, the above contracting parties, deposit the sum of $1000 each with Dickson,
Moore & Smith, the same to be forfeited by party failing to fulfill his part of above contract."
See id. at 144; see also Heath v. Huffhines, 152 S.W. 176, 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1912, no writ). In Heath, the contract was held to be a contract of sale and not an option:
and as .earnest money, and as a part of the cash consideration above mentioned, the said
A.N. Evans has this day paid to the said Heath $700 cash. . . should there be any defect
in said title, that the said Heath shall have a reasonable time to cure said defect, and in
case said title is not good the seven hundred dollars. . . shall be refunded to party of the
second part, but should the said Heath furnish a good and sufficient warranty deed and
abstract of title . . . and the said Evans fails or refuses to carry out his part of the contract, the said seven hundred dollars shall be forfeited ....
Id. at 177.
10. See Adams v. Peabody Coal Co., 82 N.E. 645, 646 (Ill. 1907) (optionor may not
withdraw offer until time for acceptance has expired); Moore v. Kirgan, 250 S.W.2d 759, 763
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1952, no writ) ("lessor cannot withdraw his offer before the time for
its acceptance has expired ..
"; optionee has protectable inchoate right)(quoting 35 C.J.
Landlord and Tenant § 182 (1924)); cf Colligan v. Smith, 366 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (optionor may not act so as to cause delay by optionee in exercising his rights).
11. See, e.g., Plantation Key Dev. v. Colonial Mortgage Co., 589 F.2d 164, 168 (5th Cir.
1979) (underlying contract and option require independent consideration); Hott v.
Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (both
components of contract must be supported by consideration); Echols v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d
798, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (if no consideration
passes, option revocable); see also Granger Real Estate Exch. v. Anderson, 145 S.W. 262, 264
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1912, no writ) (option itself is contract; if not supported by consideration may be withdrawn); IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 263, at 499 (1963 &
Kaufman Supp. 1980) (option contract may be "made by a promise for which a consideration
is given"). But see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.205 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (provides that firm offers remain irrevocable for up to three months without consideration in case
of sales of goods by merchant). The consideration necessary to make an option irrevocable
need not be large in order to be considered sufficient. If, however, the consideration is both
nominal in fact and in amount, as where it is merely recited and not actually given or promised, the optionor may revoke his offer. See Echols v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 263, at 501 (1963 & Kaufman Supp. 1980).
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sideration for the extension of the option, or the owner can revoke his
offer at any time prior to the optionee's acceptance.
If the terms of the option allow the purchaser's acceptance to be by
notice (as opposed to payment of the purchase price), once the option
is accepted, it then becomes a bilateral contract of sale which is binding on both parties. A binding contract is said to exist, whether or not
the option was originally supported by consideration, because the offer and acceptance are mutual promises (one by the seller to sell and
one by the purchaser to buy) which constitute consideration for an
executory bilateral contract of sale.12 If, however, the option specifies
that acceptance is accomplished only by the purchaser's payment of
the purchase price, the contract of sale stage is bypassed, and the sale
is consummated upon acceptance of the option, the parties never having exchanged mutual promises to buy and sell. In such case, absent
may revoke the option prior to
independent consideration, the seller
13
price.
purchase
the
of
the payment
An earnest money contract is simply a contract of sale which requires the purchaser to pay to either the seller or an escrow agent a
sum of money as earnest money prior to the closing, at which time the
balance of the purchase price is rendered.I 4 The earnest money is intended to secure the performance of the purchaser, but it is not necessary to make the contract binding unless the provision for earnest
money is so material as to constitute a condition precedent to the for12. See Texas Gas Utils. Co. v. Barrett, 460 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. 1970) (quoting Texas
Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Storal, 113 Tex. 273, 285, 253 S.W. 1101, 1105 (1923)). In
Barrett, the court stated:
Reduced to its last analysis, the rule is simply that a contract must be based upon a

valid consideration, and that a contract in which there is no consideration moving from

one party, or no obligation upon him, lacks mutuality, is unilateral, and unenforceable.
. . . It is quite elementary that the promise of one party is a valid consideration for the
promise of the other party.

Id. at 412; see also Clement v. Producer's Ref. Co., 277 S.W. 634, 635 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1925, judgmt adopted) ("Where no other consideration is shown, mutual obligations by the
parties . . . will furnish a sufficient consideration to constitute a binding contract."); Saunders
v. Commercial Indus. Serv., 541 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (quoting principles set out in Clement); Smith v. Hues, 540 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Yet if the option is properly accepted the
optionor is bound thereby and the optionee may obtain specific performance.").
13. See Hott v. Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983,

writ ref'd n.r.e.) (gratuitous option may be revoked prior to acceptance).
14. See Cowman v. Allen Monuments, Inc., 500 S.W.2d 223, 225-26 (Tex. Civ. AppTexarkana 1973, no writ); State v. Clevenger, 384 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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mation of a binding contract. 5 In Cowman v. Allen Monuments,
Inc., 16 the court noted that there is a difference between the considera-

tion for the sale (the sales price of the land) and the consideration for
the contract. It is not necessary that any money be paid at the time a
contract of sale is executed in order for it to be binding and supported
by consideration, as the mutual promises to buy and sell constitute
sufficient consideration to make the contract binding. 7
III.

OPTION AND CONTRACT OF SALE DISTINGUISHED--THE
TEST USED BY TEXAS COURTS

As a result of many Texas decisions, a test has evolved distinguishing options and earnest money contracts of sale. Basically, when an

agreement for the purchase and sale of land provides that the seller's
sole remedy in the event of the purchaser's default is retention of the
earnest money as liquidated damages, the agreement is an option contract rather than a bilateral contract of sale." The rationale underlying this rule is that if an agreement provides that the purchaser can
decline to close the transaction by forfeiting his earnest money as liquidated damages and also be exculpated from further liability, the effect of the instrument is to create an option. Thus, when the seller
15. See Cowman v. Allen Monuments, Inc., 500 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ). "It is only when the provision for a down payment or an earnest money
deposit is so material to the complete agreement that it constitutes a condition precedent, that
the failure to comply therewith will prevent the agreement from ever becoming a binding
contract." Id. at 228.
16. Id. at 223.
17. See id. at 227; see also Ragan v. Schreffler, 306 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Mo. 1957). The
court stated:
It is the recognized general rule that a promise by one party to a contract is a sufficient
consideration for a promise by the other party. If, therefore, there is a promise on the
part of a purchaser to buy and pay the purchase price, this itself is a sufficient consideration for the promise of a vendor to sell and convey.
Id. at 499. This statement by the Missouri Supreme Court was cited with approval by the
Texarkana court of appeals. See Cowman v. Allen Monuments, Inc., 500 S.W.2d 223, 227
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ).
18. See Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 353 S.W.2d 841, 843
(Tex. 1962); Moss & Raley v. Wren, 102 Tex. 567, 569-70, 120 S.W. 847, 847 (1909);
Texlouana Producing & Ref. Co. v. Wall, 257 S.W. 875, 878 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgmt
adopted); Hott v. Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 853-54 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); John Dull & Co. v. Life of Neb. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); Broady v. Mitchell, 572 S.W.2d 36, 40 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Reiser v. Jennings, 143 S.W.2d 99, 104 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.); Tate v. Morris, Graham & Morris, 248 S.W.
797, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1922, no writ).
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does not have the right to specific performance, but is confined to the
remedy of liquidated damages, the arrangement is deemed to be an
option rather than an absolute agreement of sale and purchase.1 9
State v. Clevenger20 represents the one aberration from the line of
cases noted above. The Houston court of appeals, in Clevenger, expressly held that a contract which limited the seller's sole remedy
against a defaulting buyer to liquidated damages constituted a contract of sale and not an option. 2 ' The case is weak authority on this
point since it ignores the long line of cases indicating that such a contract is in fact an option.22 Additionally, though the case received a
"writ refused, no reversible error" designation from the Texas
Supreme Court, it was a condemnation case in which the importance
of the nature of the instrument was evidentiary, and the appeals court
itself stated that admitting the instrument as a contract of sale was
harmless error.23
In determining whether an agreement is an option contract or a
contract of sale, it is important to remember that, as a matter of law,
the seller has the right to seek specific performance of a contract by

19. The following contractual provision exemplifies the type of language which will typically render an agreement between parties an option rather than a contract of sale:
And it is further mutually agreed, in case purchaser fails to comply with the terms
hereof relating to the payment and securing of the purchase price as above mentioned,
and by the time herein designated, purchaser shall forfeit the amount paid hereon to
seller, and the same shall be paid to seller by said trustees and accepted by said seller as
and for liquidated damages for such injury and damage as the seller may suffer by reason
of the nonperformance of this contract on the part of the purchaser.
Moss & Raley v. Wren, 102 Tex. 567, 569-70, 113 S.W. 739, 739 (1908). In deciding that this
language constituted an option rather than a contract of sale, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issues presented in the following manner:
[B]ut, if the seller is bound to accept the sum for such damages as may be suffered by
reason of the nonperformance of the contract on part of the purchaser, can he sue the
proposed purchaser for specific performance of the contract? . . . [S]hould [purchaser]
decline for any reason to pay the price and to accept the land, he may pay the liquidated
damages and be absolved from further suit. . . . For this reason we answer the question
in the negative.
Id. at 569-70, 120 S.W. at 847.
20. 384 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. See id. at 210.
22. See id. at 210. The court based its decision on the fact that: "[tihe signatories to such
contract in the utmost good faith entered into a valid and binding agreement for the sale and
" The court also placed emphasis on the fact that the
purchase of the land in question ....
parties mutually obligated themselves to buy and sell according to their agreement and that
nothing other than the final performance remained to be done. See id. at 210.
23. See id. at 211.
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the purchaser 24 unless the contract expressly provides that liquidated
damages are to be the seller's sole and exclusive remedy. 25 Therefore,

unless the contract provides that the seller must accept liquidated
damages in full settlement of the buyer's liabilities for failure to
purchase the property, without any other recourse against the buyer,
the contract is not an option.26 Thus, the mere fact that the contract
entitles the seller to receive liquidated damages upon the buyer's default does not render it an option since the seller could also still be
entitled to specific performance.2 7
An extreme example of the courts' tendency to construe contracts
so as to allow any remedy not specifically excluded is Bifano v.
Young.2 8 In Bifano, the parties signed a printed lease form, in which
they deleted two of three remedies listed under the heading "Remedies of Landlord" and also deleted the final paragraph declaring the

24. See, e.g., Hage v. Westgate Square Commercial, 598 S.W.2d 709, 712-13 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (vendor may have suit for specific performance and part of
relief may include foreclosure of implied vendor's lien); Tabor v. Ragle, 526 S.W.2d 670, 675
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (general rule is that vendor or vendee
may sue for specific performance); Clifton v. Charles, 116 S.W. 120, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.1909, writ ref'd) (upon nonperformance vendee or vendor may enforce specific performance
against breaching party). But see Rosenfield v. Pollock Realty Co., 416 S.W.2d 833, 836-37
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ) (where vendor could not deliver clear title, specific
performance not available); Alling v. Vander Stucken, 194 S.W. 443, 444 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1917, writ ref'd) (where vendor in default, purchaser not compelled to perform).
25. See Tabor v. Ragle, 526 S.W.2d 670, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
26. See Gala Homes, Inc. v. Fritz, 393 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Gala, the court held that in determining whether a contract is an option
or a contract of sale,
the test for determining the effect of the provisions relating to the down payment as
liquidated damages is whether the seller is "bound" to accept the sum "for such damages
as may be suffered by reason of the nonperformance of the contract" on the purchaser's
part, . . . otherwise he can enforce the contract by requiring specific performance.
Id. at 411; see also Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna & Surety Co., 353 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex.
1962) (forfeiture provision will not change status of contract of sale unless stated to be vendor's sole remedy); Tabor v. Ragle, 526 S.W.2d 670, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing proposition set forth in Gala).
27. See Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna & Surety Co., 353 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1962);
see also Texlouana Producing & Ref. Co. v. Wall, 257 S.W. 875, 878 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924,
judgmt adopted). The contract in Texlouana did contain a forfeiture provision, but the court
held that, as it was merely intended to secure performance and did not require that the vendor
accept the liquidated damages as his sole remedy, the vendor was not precluded from seeking
specific performance. See id. at 878.
28. 665 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e).
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list to be nonexclusive. The lease provisions interpreted by the court
set forth the landlord's remedies as follows:
20.

REMEDIES OF LANDLORD:

Upon the occurrence of any of the

events of default listed in Section 19, Landlord shall have the option to
pursue any one or more of the following remedies without any notice or
demand whatsoever.
A. Terminate this lease, in which event Tenant shall immediately surrender the demised premises to Landlord. If Tenant fails to so surrender such premises, Landlord may, without prejudice to any other
remedy which it may have for possession of the demised premises or
arrearages in rent, enter upon and take possession of the demised premises and expel or remove Tenant and any other person who may be
occupying such premises or any part thereof, by force if necessary,
without being liable for prosecution or any claim for damages therefor.
Tenant shall pay to Landlord on demand the amount of all loss and
damage which Landlord may suffer by reason of such termination,
whether through inability to relet the demised premises on satisfactory
terms or otherwise.
B. Enter UFOn and take possession of the demised Fre1 1tises, by foree-if
neesa' without terminating this lease and without being liable for
rrmv
Proenton14." or foqr any elai1 n for damage, therefor, and mte
Tenant and any ote person who may be oeettpying suceh premises or
any-part thereof.i Landlord may relet the demise~d prmie and reie
the rent therefor. Tenntagres to pay to Landlord monthly or on de
ma1 .d From time to time a11y defieie1ncy that may arise by reason of any
stieh reletting. in determiningthe amount of ste defieieney, the bro
kerag eommission, attorneys' fees, remodeling exene and other
costs of reletting shall be subtracted From1 the arnotint of ren1 t reei
G.

Enter upo the..

s

by foree, if nea

p

wth

terminlating this lease and without being liable for prseto
oany, elai for damage therefor, and do whateve.r Tni
obligatedt

do under the termsof this lease. Tenant agrees to pay Landlord-on
.erandfor,
expnse
l

hieh

Landlold

1ua

.z..

thuds effecting

thisLease, togethe. with inter
est thro at the rate of 10% per annum fro the date exene until
paid. Landlord shall not be liable for any darnages resulting to the Ten
an.t fo steh aetio.., whether cautsed by nelgee of Landlord or
othese
Pursuit of any of the foregoig remedies shall not preelu. Fursuit of
any oftheotereedies herein provided or any other remedies provided by law, nor shall pursuit of an.y remdy herein Frvie eonstittute
a forfeiture or wave ofayet
due to Landlord hereunderorofa
plia..ee with Tenan.t's obligations tinder
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terms, co. 1 ditions an1d eaveants herein eontai 1 cd. '

Even though paragraphs (B) and (C) and the succeeding non-exclusive remedies paragraph of the form were marked through and the
deletion was initialed by both parties, because the first sentence of that
portion of the lease said that the landlord could pursue the listed remedies at his "option," the deletion of the provision declaring the listed
remedies to be a non-exclusive provision was held to be insufficient to
evidence the parties' intent to limit the landlord's remedies to the one
remedy listed.30 While this case concerns the interpretation of a lease,
there are many printed contracts of sale containing similar provisions,
and attorneys frequently cross out alternative remedy clauses with the
intention that the remaining clause shall be the only applicable remedy upon default.
Another recent example of the tendency of the courts to permit any
remedy which is not explicitly barred by specific contractual limitations of remedies is found in Ryan Mortgage Investors v. FlemingWood.31 In this case, the contract in question specifically authorized
only one remedy, but did not expressly bar the pursuit of any other
remedy and, therefore, did not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing
any other remedy which the law afforded in addition to the remedy
specifically provided in the contract. The specific provisions of this
contract stated:
12. SELLER warrants and represents to BUYER that at the time of
closing hereunder it will have and will convey to BUYER good and mar-

29. Id. at 543-44 (lease as marked through by the parties reprinted following opinion).
30. See Bifano v. Young, 665 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ
ref d n.r.e.). The appellant in Bifano contended that, by striking through the form provisions
for remedies on default, the parties intended that appellee's only available remedy was to be
that listed in paragraph (A), relating to termination of the lease and any damages resulting
therefrom. The court rejected this contention by stating that the lease provision stipulating
that appellee had "the option to pursue any one or more of the following remedies without any
notice or demand whatsoever" was not marked through by the parties. See id. at 539. The
court also noted that remedies provided in a contract may be permissive or exclusive. In order
for the remedy to be considered exclusive it must be shown that the parties clearly indicated
that their intent was that it be exclusive. See id. at 539; see also Vandergriff Chevrolet Co. v.
Forum Bank, 613 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (remedies may
be exclusive or permissive; must have clear intent to be exclusive); West Texas Utils. Co. v.
Huber, 292 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.) (if remedy is
permissive, it is in addition to those provided by law).
31. 650 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
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ketable title to the Property, free and clear of any and all encumbrances,
except those set forth in Exhibit "B."...
17. In the event the Seller is unable to convey title to the Property in
accordance with Paragraph 12 of this Contract, BUYER may at its option terminate this Contract by written notice delivered to SELLER on
or prior to the scheduled closing date (as deferred by any postponement
in accordance with Paragraph 19); otherwise BUYER shall be conclusively deemed to have accepted SELLER'S title.32
Upon discovery that his client did not have marketable title, the
seller's attorney advised the purchaser that he had two alternatives
under the contract: either to accept title with the lis pendens in place
(the element rendering the title unmarketable) or to terminate the
contract. The surprised seller, to his chagrin, discovered that, despite
the language providing that the purchaser could either receive a refund of its earnest money or elect to close notwithstanding title defects, the purchaser could also seek damages for the seller's failure to
convey marketable title to the property.33 Thus, the importance of
expressly limiting the remedies allowed for breach of contract by explicitly reciting that they are the sole and exclusive remedies and are
to be accepted in full satisfaction of the breaching party's liabilities
can readily be seen. Failure to carefully articulate such limitations
will transform what a purchaser intended to be an "option" contract
into a contract of sale.
IV.

DIFFERENCES IN OPERATION AND EFFECT

It is important to be aware of whether an agreement will be deemed
a contract of sale or an option due to the legal differences in construction and consequences. This is true regardless of whether one's client
is a seller or purchaser.
A.

Time of the Essence

Unless otherwise stated, time is not of the essence in a contract of
32. Id. at 933.
33. See id. at 933. The sellers argued that the remedies under paragraph 17 were exclusive and thereby excused the lack of marketable title on the closing date. The court stated that,
despite the express remedies provision in paragraph 17, the seller was still under a duty to
convey marketable title. Although paragraph 17 gave the buyer a remedy which he did not
have under common law, it did not expressly exclude his common law remedies, and, there-

fore, the buyer was not precluded from asserting such remedies, as well as those specifically
provided. See id. at 933.
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sale, whereas it is in an option contract.34
B.

Substantial Compliance

Similarly, substantial compliance may be sufficient with regard to
the time of performance in a contract of sale,35 but strict compliance
with the terms of the option contract is required in the optionee's
exercise of an option.3 6 Since an option contract is strictly construed
so as to limit the obligation of the optionor, even minor deviation

from its prescribed terms can extinguish the rights of the optionee.
Thus, if a purchaser arrived for a closing a few hours late with closing
papers which deviated from the contractual specifications in some minor way, the contract for sale would probably still be binding,
although the breaching party would be liable for any damages caused
by the breach. However, if an optionee exercised the option one minute late, or by telephone when telegram was required, the option
would be terminated because no valid exercise of the option in the

prescribed mode had occurred. 37 The optionee is not, however, liable
34. It has long been accepted that time is of the essence in an option contract. See Johnson v. Portwood, 89 Tex. 235, 245, 34 S.W. 596, 598 (1896); Smith v. Hues, 540 S.W.2d 485,
488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); White v. Miller, 518
S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ dism'd); Herber v. Sanders, 336 S.W.2d
783, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ); McCaleb v. Wyatt, 257 S.W.2d 880, 881
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In an ordinary contract of sale, time is
not of the essence unless the contract explicitly provides such. See Smith v. Warth, 483
S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); Gala Homes, Inc. v. Fritz, 393
S.W.2d 409, 411-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, one of the essential
differences between an option and a conditional sale is that where an option does not provide a
time limit within which the optionee must act, the law will presume that a reasonable time was
intended; where a conditional sales contract provides no time limit, a reasonable time will not
be presumed by law. See Lusher v. First Nat'l Bank, 260 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. See, e.g., Carroll v. Wied, 572 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
no writ); Herber v. Sanders, 336 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ);
Shields v. Dunlap, 174 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, no writ).
36. See Zeidman v. Davis, 161 Tex. 496, 499, 342 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1961) ("in the absence of equities an optionee is held to a strict compliance with the terms of the option agreement"); Suiter v. Woodard, 635 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ refd n.r.e.)
("must be accepted strictly in accordance with its terms"); White v. Miller, 518 S.W.2d 383,
385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ dism'd). In White, the court stated:
To be effectual, acceptance of an option must be unqualified, absolute, unconditional,
unequivocal, unambiguous, positive, without reservation and according to terms or conditions of the option. Substantial compliance with the terms of an option is not sufficient to
constitute an acceptance. The acceptance must be in identical terms with the offer.
Id. at 385.
37. See Sanchez v. Dickinson, 551 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977,
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in any way with respect to such nonconformity because he never had
incurred any obligation to perform in the first place; an option merely
confers the right, but not the obligation, to purchase property upon
the optionee, provided such right is exercised in accord with the terms
of the option.38
C. Risk of Loss
Another important difference between an option and a contract of
sale pertains to who bears the risk of loss. In the case of a contract of
sale and in the absence of any provisions addressing the issue of risk
of loss, the equitable title passes to the purchaser and with it the risk
of loss, under the doctrine of equitable conversion. 39 As an option
does not confer on the optionee an equitable or legal interest in the
land subject to the option," the risk of loss remains with the seller
until the option is exercised and becomes a binding contract of sale;4"
should loss occur, however, the optionor is not required to restore the
property, and the optionee is not entitled to an abatement of the
purchase price.
D. Broker's Right to Commission
Whether a broker is entitled to his commission is frequently dependent on whether he procured a buyer who entered into a contract of
sale or who is merely a party to an option. Generally, to be entitled to
a commission, the broker must procure a purchaser who is ready,
willing, and able to buy on terms acceptable to the seller and secure
no writ) (must act in accordance with terms as set out in contract); Lambert v. Taylor Tel.
Coop., Inc., 276 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1955, no writ) (must have strict
compliance; acceptance modifying terms no acceptance).
38. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Allbritton, 147 Tex. 468, 475, 218 S.W.2d 185, 188 (1949);
Northside Lumber & Bldg. Co. v. Neal, 23 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1929, no writ).
39. See Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 353 S.W.2d 841, 844-45
(Tex. 1962); Lay v.. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.); Smith v. Warth, 483 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ).
"[W]here property contracted to be sold is damaged by fire, storm or other cause, not the fault
of either party to the contract, the loss will fall on the party who, at the time, owned the
beneficial interest in the property." Id. at 836.
40. See Whitson Co. v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 278 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1955) (option is executory contract which passes no title), affd, 156 Tex. 139, 293
S.W.2d 488 (1956).
41. Cf 5A J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3366, at

219 (1970) (option holder has no equitable title and not entitled to insurance proceeds).
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from the purchaser an enforceable contract in writing. 42 Thus, where
there are no provisions denying the broker his commission upon the
default of the purchaser, the broker is entitled to his commission regardless of whether or not the buyer defaults under the contract of
sale.43 If the purchaser declined to close under an option, however,
the broker would not be so entitled."
E. Evidentiary Value in Condemnation Cases
The evidentiary value of an option and a contract of sale in a condemnation case also differs. An option contract is not admissible as
evidence to show land value; 45 a contract of sale, on the other hand, is
competent evidence of land value in a condemnation suit. 46 If the

contract was not consummated, the evidentiary weight of the contract
might be affected, but the contract is nevertheless admissible. 4

42. See Fuess v. Mueller, 630 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no
writ); Neigut v. McFadden, 257 S.W.2d 864, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1953, writ refd
n.r.e.); Cohen v. Cottle, 193 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. Civ. App.- El Paso 1945, no writ). The
terms "ready," "willing," and "able" each convey a distinct idea, and all three elements must
be present in order for the broker to be entitled to his commission. It has been held that a
purchaser is not willing to deal when before the transaction becomes binding, he refuses to
consummate it, or asks for additional time to consider particular aspects of the transaction.
See Sheehan v. Driskell, 465 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971,
writ refd n.r.e.) (broker not entitled to commission where purchaser withdrew offer before
acceptance by seller); Granger Real Estate Exch. v. Anderson, 145 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1912, no writ) (broker not entitled where prospective purchaser requested extra
time to perform).
43. See Hamburger & Dreyling v. Thomas, 103 Tex. 280, 283, 126 S.W. 561, 561 (1910);
Wilson v. Crawford, 130 S.W. 227, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-1910, no writ).
44. See Phillips v. Jones, 283 S.W. 298, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1926, no writ);
Runck v. Dimmick, 111 S.W. 779, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-1908, no writ).
45. See Hanks v. Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry., 159 Tex. 311, 316, 320 S.W.2d 333, 336 (1959)
(unaccepted offer not admissible evidence); State v. Clevenger, 384 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("unaccepted offers to buy or sell are incompetent evidence of land value in condemnation suits"); Loumparoff v. Housing Auth., 261 S.W.2d 224,
228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, no writ) (unaccepted offer constitutes inadmissible
evidence).
46. See State v. Clevenger, 384 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
47. See id. at 209; see also Robards v. State, 285 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Robards, the court admitted the amount of the contract as
competent evidence in an eminent domain proceeding and stated: "A contract of sale is not an
offer. It is, if valid, a binding obligation on all parties. In our opinion it was admissible. That
the contract was rescinded could of course be shown as lessening its weight as evidence of
market value." See id. at 249.
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F. Consideration
Because the form of earnest money contract frequently used by purchasers is actually an option, albeit the purchaser is frequently not
aware of its status as such, problems can arise if the question of consideration for the option is not addressed by the contract's draftsman.
As noted earlier, an option must be supported by consideration necessary to make the option irrevocable, since no promise to buy the land
can serve as consideration for the option. 48 A promise to pay earnest
money may constitute consideration for an option, so long as the optionee is actually obligated to pay the money, or a portion thereof,
even if the purchaser terminates the contract during his "free look"
contingency period.49
Echols v. Bloom 0 and Hott v. Pearcy/Christon,Inc.,51 illustrate the
problem confronting the purchaser when an earnest money contract is
discovered to be an option and the earnest money has not been paid.
In Echols, a proposed earnest money contract of sale, that provided
an option period for accepting the contract, recited that $500 earnest
money had been paid. The earnest money was not actually tendered
until the last day of the option period. Prior to the time the consideration passed, and prior to the buyer's acceptance, the seller revoked
the offer. Because the option was not supported by consideration and
had not been accepted, the seller was free to revoke his offer, and the
buyer had no recourse against the seller with respect to the seller's

48. See supra notes 11, 12; see also IA A.

CORBIN,

CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 263, at 505

(1963 & Kaufman Supp. 1983), which states:
Where a promise or agreement that is in form contractual is in fact not binding for lack
of. . . consideration. . . it is a mere revocable offer, not an option contract. The offeree
has a power of acceptance and has an option between accepting and not accepting ...

So, if the only consideration is an illusory promise, there is no contract and no binding
option ....
Id. at 505.
49. See IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 263 (1963 & Kaufman Supp. 1983);

see also 14 TEX. JUR. 3d Contracts § 138, at 229-30 (1981), which states:
A contract by which one person promises to sell or convey to another an interest in
land, in consideration of money to be paid or acts to be performed by the other party, is
lacking in mutuality and cannot be enforced if the agreement does not, at the same time,
absolutely bind the other party to pay or perform the consideration stipulated.

Id. at 229-30.
50. 485 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

51. 663 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
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revocation.5 2 The Echols court noted that if a contract which is supported by sufficient consideration contains an option, no independent
53
consideration for the option need appear.
A most common example of an enforceable option lacking independent consideration is a lease contract which contains a purchase
option. The purchase option, as well as the use of the premises, is
supported (i.e., deemed to be granted in partial consideration of) by
the tenant's agreement to pay rent.54 This analysis would not, in most
instances, apply to a contract of sale which contains an option period
for acceptance because no binding contract of sale arises until the option is exercised, and the customary consideration for the contract is
the promise to buy. Therefore, in order to insure that the seller cannot back out, the optionee must tender independent consideration for
the option at its inception, rather than at the time of its exercise. 55
In Hott, an earnest money contract was held to be an option because the buyer's liability under the contract was limited to the forfeiture of his earnest money.56 The instrument did not require an
52. See Echols v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d 798, 800-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. See id. at 800.
54. See Moore v. Kirgan, 250 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1952, no
writ). The Moore court clearly set forth the law regarding purchase options:

An option to purchase, being an integral part of a lease, is a substantial part of the
whole contract, and is not obnoxious to the objection that there is a want of mutuality,

and the agreement to pay rent or do other acts will support the option as well as the right
to occupy under the lease, and bind the lessor notwithstanding the lessee is not bound to
purchase. The lessor cannot withdraw his offer before the time for its acceptance has
expired, without the lessee's consent, although the contract is not under seal, or after the
lessee exercises the option according to the terms of the agreement. The option constitutes a completed purchase of a right to have a conveyance if the purchaser shall choose
to buy on the terms named. And while no right or estate in the land passes under a
covenant for an option to purchase, it is an inchoate right which will be protected in
equity pending the option period. The option to purchase is a covenant running with the
land.
Id. at 762-63 (quoting 35 C.J. Landlord & Tenant § 182 (1924)). Where the option and the
lease constitute one contract, the provisions of which are independent, the agreement to pay
rent will be sufficient consideration to support the option. See id. at 763; see also Hereford v.
Tilson, 198 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946) (agreement to pay rent sufficient consideration for option), rev'd on other grounds, 145 Tex. 600, 200 S.W.2d 985 (1947).
55. See Hott v. Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983,
writ refd n.r.e.); Echols v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
56. See Hott v. Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.c.).
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immediate payment of earnest money, but provided that the buyer
would make a series of payments to extend the deadline of the financing contingency period provided in the contract. The seller revoked
the option before the first payment was made. Since during the contract's initial period of time no consideration had passed and the option had not been exercised, the seller was able to revoke the option.
The Hott court held that the option contract was properly revoked
before "the payment of independent consideration that would make it
an irrevocable option contract." 5 The possibility that the payments
were an absolute obligation and, thus, the promise to pay was consideration from the outset was not discussed in the case. Although an
absolute promise to pay money would constitute consideration, apparently there was not an obligation to make the series of payments,
and the payments were merely conditions to the continuation of the
option. In light of this uncertainty, however, the purchaser would
want to consider structuring his earnest money contract so that there
is always an initial payment of money, in order to avoid dispute about
the absoluteness of a future obligation and to furnish the "independent consideration" required under Hott.
Problems can arise in connection with the "outs" the purchaser has
under various contingency provisions, which allow the purchaser to
terminate the contract and thereupon secure a refund of his earnest
money. The earnest money paid at the time the contract is entered
into could furnish consideration for the option; however, the fact that
for a period of time the purchaser may terminate the contract and
receive his earnest money back may make the option unsupported by
consideration during this period and thus revocable by the seller.58
Until the earnest money is actually at risk, the seller is not bound.
Once the purchaser can no longer terminate the contract without
forfeiting the earnest money, the option is then binding upon the
seller. To ensure that the option is irrevocable from the outset, how-

57. See id. at 853. The court additionally provided:
While generally the mutual promise to buy and sell are sufficient to create a binding
contract to convey land, they are not sufficient when the buyer's liability is limited to

forfeiture of his earnest money. The effect of limiting liability results in an option to
purchase, revocable at the will of the seller, unless and until an independent consideration
is paid.

Id. at 853.
58. See Echols v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

1972, wit ref'd n.r.e.).
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ever, the practice of having the buyer tender a sum of money which is
to be paid to the seller, regardless of whether or not the purchaser
exercises its right to terminate the contract, is suggested. Such a
course would also avoid the problem of whether the earnest money
was intended as an option fee, liquidated damages, or an unenforceable penalty. If a large earnest money deposit is at stake, characterizing it explicitly as an "option fee" may protect the seller from
challenges to his right to retain the full amount of the escrow.
A very small consideration can be sufficient to support the promise
of an option giver. 9 It is also said that consideration is "sufficient" if
it is bargained for. 6 The general rule is that whatever consideration a
promisor agrees to is legally sufficient consideration. 61 The danger
would seem to exist, however, that if the amount is extremely disproportionate to the size of the deal, the consideration could be attacked
as nominal, the contract could be attacked as illusory, and the seller
could assert that he is not bound. Some precautions might be helpful,
such as reciting in the agreement that the amount was bargained for,
why it is appropriate, etc. Care should be taken that the consideration is not merely recited and never paid, for parol evidence will be
admissible to show that a factual recitation that a sum was paid is
false and that the consideration never actually passed.62
The effect of the contingencies and review period on the nature of
59. See Marsh v. Lott, 97 P. 163, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908) (sufficiency of price paid for
option not measured by its adequacy); Miller v. Kimmel, 184 P. 762, 765 (Okla. 1919) (weight
of authority holds consideration of one dollar adequate for option of reasonable duration); see
also 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 263, at 500 (1963 & Kaufman Supp. 1980) (one
dollar may be sufficient to make option irrevocable); accord Teague v. Edwards, 159 Tex. 94,
97, 315 S.W.2d 950, 952 (1958) (promise to pay insurance proceeds sufficient though recovery
from insurance might be remote contingency); Hovas v. O'Brien, 654 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("quid pro quo is not required to create a
valid consideration").
60. See 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 127, at 540 (1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981); see also Hoffer v. Eastland Nat'l Bank, 169 S.W.2d 275,
281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, no writ) (for thing to be consideration, one party must
offer and the other accept that thing as such).
61. See Teague v. Edwards, 159 Tex. 94, 97-98, 315 S.W.2d 950, 952-53 (1958); Hicks v.
Smith, 330 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. See Higgins v. Mossler Acceptance Co., 140 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, writ dism'd); Radford v. Snyder Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n, 121 S.W.2d 478, 480
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, no writ); see also 14 TEX. JUR. 3d Contracts § 105 (1981).
Where a written contract recites the consideration, or states that it has been paid, it is prima
facie evidence that the consideration has passed. See id. § 105. This evidence may, however,
be refuted by parol evidence showing the true consideration. See id. § 105.
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the contract will become less important if the purchaser recognizes
that the earnest money contract is an option and steps are taken to
bind the seller. A contingency upon the purchaser's obligation to
close may render the contract an option rather than a contract binding on both parties; but a considerable amount of authority supports
the proposition that a contingency, such as satisfactory zoning or financing, implies an obligation on the party to use due diligence to
bring it about and does not give the party a choice as to whether or
not to perform.63 Although a promise to perform made subject to the
wish, will, caprice, or desire of the promisor may be illusory, 64 Texas
courts have upheld contracts in which a performance has been made
subject to the approval or satisfaction of the purchaser regarding
either some aspect affecting the purchaser's ability to perform (frequently title contingency provisions), or the suitability of the property
for its contemplated use. 65 The decision of the purchaser exercising
such discretion must be made honestly and in good faith. In change
to this regard, some courts hold that an objective "reasonable man"
63. See Rhodessa Dev. Co. v. Simpson, 658 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983,
no writ). The court stated:
We conclude that Rhodessa's contract, which contained a condition precedent and was
subject to a zoning change, must be construed to place an implied obligation upon the
buyer to use due diligence to obtain such zoning change. Otherwise, the buyer has the
added option to sit idly by if it determines that the contract is not advantageous and,
when the zoning never occurs, consider the contract terminated without suffering any
damages.
Id. at 220; see also Langley v. Norris, 141 Tex. 405, 412-13, 173 S.W.2d 454, 458 (1943);
Carroll v. Wied, 572 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ). In Carroll, the court held that a provision making the contract contingent on the purchaser's ability
to obtain a loan implied an obligation on the purchaser to diligently pursue obtaining a loan
and that he would have a reasonable time within which to act. See id. at 97.
64. See 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 644, at 83-84 (1963). Professor
Corbin cites the case of Mattei v. Hooper, 330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958), for the proposition that a
contract for the sale of land containing a provision making the purchaser's obligation contingent on his ability to find satisfactory tenants for the property is not, of itself, illusory. The
contract would be illusory, however, if the purchaser's decision was not made honestly and in
good faith, or if it was based on "whim, caprice, or a belated opinion that the land was not
worth the agreed price." See 3A A. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 644, at 83-84 (1963).
65. See Rhodessa Dev. Co. v. Simpson, 658 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983,
no writ) (contract subject to purchaser obtaining proper zoning); Carroll v. Wied, 572 S.W.2d
93, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (contract contingent on purchaser obtaining loan); Campbell v. Hart, 256 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (contract subject to satisfactory title); cf Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Tex. 1976) (embodies same principle in construction contract
where inspector's decision was conclusive as to whether or not job was satisfactorily
completed).
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standard will be imposed; however, in Texas it has been held that if
the party makes an honest, considered determination, it is irrelevant
that a reasonable purchaser would have been satisfied.66
It may be unnecessary to make the above arguments if the contract
has been properly drafted. Even if the contract is subject to the
"wish, will, or desire" of the purchaser, if it is already recognized that
the contract is an option, and independent consideration (that is, independent of the illusory promise) in the form of a non-refundable
option payment has been made at the contract's inception, the option
is supported by consideration and is binding on the seller.
V.

EXAMINING THE PURCHASER-ORIENTED CONTRACTDRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS

A. Independent Consideration
A typical purchaser-oriented contract will frequently provide that
the seller may, as his sole remedy, retain the purchaser's earnest
money deposit as liquidated damages for the purchaser's failure to
close the transaction. This type of provision does not adequately protect the purchaser's interests because, as previously discussed, this
limitation of the seller's remedies renders the contract an option.67
Since the option is not supported by independent consideration, it is
merely a continuing offer which may be freely revoked by the seller at
any time prior to the purchaser's acceptance.68 In order to remedy
this deficiency, the authors suggest that such contracts employ a provision setting forth the existence of such independent consideration, in
a manner similar to the following provision:
Contemporaneously with the execution of this Contract, Purchaser
66. See Campbell v. Hart, 256 S.W.2d 255, 262-63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953,
writ refd n.r.e.). The Campbell court held:
If such a contract be made, the party to be satisfied is the judge of his own satisfaction,
subject to the limitation that he must act in good faith. He should fairly and candidly
investigate and consider the matter, reach a genuine conclusion, and express the true state
of his mind ....
Having done this, his satisfaction or dissatisfaction fixed the rights of
the parties. It is of no consequence that a court or jury might believe that he ought to
have been satisfied or that a reasonably prudent purchaser would have been satisfied.
Id. at 262-63.
67. See Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 353 S.W.2d 841, 843
(Tex. 1962). For further support, see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
68. See Hott v. Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). For further support, see supra notes 11-12, 47-56, and accompanying text.
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hereby delivers to Seller and Seller hereby acknowledges the delivery of,
a check in the amount of Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($50.00) ("Independent Contract Consideration"), which amount the parties bargained for and agreed to as consideration for the seller's grant to
Purchaser's exclusive right to purchase the property pursuant to the
terms hereof and for Seller's execution, delivery and performance of this
Contract. This Independent Contract Consideration is in addition to
and independent of any other consideration or payment provided in this
Contract, is nonrefundable, and shall be retained by Seller notwithstanding any other provision of this Contract.69
The use of the term "Independent Contract Consideration" or a similar phrase, instead of an explicit designation of the sum as an "option
fee," may be desirable for bargaining purposes, as some sellers may be
wary of an "option," due to its explicit tentativeness, even though
they agree to limit their remedy for default to retention of the "earnest money."
B. Assignment of the Contract
The right to assign a contract is frequently crucial to the purchaser
for a variety of reasons. It is essential to his ability to make a quick
profit that he is able to "flip" his rights under the contract to another
party with little or no risk. Even if this is not the purchaser's primary
objective, frequently he will want to sell or contribute his rights to a
limited partnership, which will close the transaction and take title to
the property, thereby enabling the purchaser to raise capital through
syndication, derive syndication fees, and enjoy tax benefits. Under
common law, if a contract is silent as to the issue of assignment, the
contract is freely assignable if the obligations it imposes do not entail
the personal performance or creditworthiness of the purchaser.7 °
69. Suggested contractual language used in this article is taken from specific contracts
used by the authors in real estate transactions. If the reader chooses to utilize this language, he

or she must use extreme care to insure that these provisions do not conflict with any other
provisions in his or her contract.
70. See Hallman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 368 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1966); Lancaster v.
Greer, 572 S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Zale Corp. v.
Decorama, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When a

contract is freely assignable, however, the law in Texas provides that although a party may
assign his contractual benefits and obligations, the assignor remains liable for the proper per-

formance of the contractual obligations; also, a provision stating that the agreement shall include and be binding on assignees is not construed to authorize a release. See Western Oil

Sales Corp. v. Bliss & Wetherbee, 299 S.W. 637, 638 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt
adopted); H.M.R. Constr. Co. v. Woolco, 422 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
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Rather than risk any potential dispute in regard to this issue, the purchaser should secure a contractual provision clearly setting forth the
parties' agreement that the purchaser may freely assign the contract.
The purchaser should also seek the inclusion of a provision stating
that, upon such assignment, the seller shall look solely to the assignee
for the payment and performance of the purchaser's obligations and
duties thereunder. These concerns are addressed in the following example of such a provision:
This Contract shall inure to the benefit of and be binding on the parties
hereto and their respective legal representatives, successors, and assigns.
Either party may assign its rights hereunder at any time at or prior to
Closing to any other person or entity. Seller agrees that if Purchaser
assigns its rights under this Contract, such assignment will have the
effect of fully releasing Purchaser from any and all obligations and duties hereunder without the necessity of further documentation to evidence the same. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, upon any such
assignment, Seller further agrees to execute any such documents as Purchaser may require to further evidence that Purchaser has been released
from any and all liability with regard to the Contract.
Raising the issue of assignment, however, could be unprofitable because the seller would likely reject such a provision. The most preferable alternative would be to artfully include recitals indicating that
the duties and obligations of the purchaser under the contract are not
personal in nature, that they may be performed by the purchaser
and/or designee, and that no personal liability of the purchaser shall
exist with respect thereto. This would enable the purchaser to maintain that the contract is assignable by virtue of operation of law.
C. Limitation of Seller's Remedies-The Purchaser'sPerspective
It is essential to the protection of the purchaser that the limitation
of liability to the loss of his earnest money be clearly and unambiguously articulated. Otherwise, it is possible that a court may decide
that the seller can either elect to retain the purchaser's deposit, pursue
damages, or seek specific performance (i.e., payment of the full
purchase price) against the purchaser. 7 The authors suggest that
[14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Potts v. Burkett, 278 S.W. 471, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Eastland 1926, no writ).
71. The fact that this is a real possibility and not merely a theoretical danger is amply and
dramatically illustrated by two recent decisions by Texas courts of appeal. In 1983, the
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such contracts employ a provision setting forth the seller's sole and
exclusive remedy in a manner similar to the following provision:
If Purchaser fails or refuses to consummate the purchase of the Property pursuant to this Contract at the Closing, for any reason other than
termination of this Contract by Purchaser pursuant to a right so to terminate expressly set forth in this Contract or Seller's failure to perform
Seller's obligations under this contract, then Seller, as Seller's sole and
exclusive remedy, shall have the right to terminate this Contract by giving written notice thereof to Purchaser prior to or at the Closing,
whereupon neither party hereto shall have any further rights or obligations hereunder, and Title Company shall deliver the Earnest Money to
Seller as liquidated damages, free of any claims by Purchaser or any
other person with respect thereto. It is agreed that the Earnest Money
to which the Seller is entitled hereunder is a reasonable forecast of just
compensation for the harm that would be caused by Purchaser's breach
and that the harm that would be caused by such breach is one that is
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.
D. Limitation of Seller's Remedies-The Seller's Perspective
As previously discussed, the limitation of the seller's remedies to
retention of the earnest money deposit, absent independent consideration, creates a revocable option. However, the language which expresses the contemplated limitation on the purchaser's liability may
have unintended consequences, since the concept of such limitation is
frequently articulated by provisions characterizing the seller's retention of the earnest money as "liquidated damages" for such breach.
Such provisions may be subject to subsequent challenges by the purchaser on the grounds that they impose a penalty or forfeiture, rather
than constituting a bona fide attempt to fix liquidated damages in the
absence of a basis for ascertaining the extent of the potential detriment which would be suffered by the seller in the event of the pur-

Corpus Christi court held that although the parties struck out two of the three remedies listed,
the parties did not intend to provide only one exclusive remedy, as the precatory language
reciting that "the landlord shall have the option to pursue any one or more of the following
remedies" was not deleted. Consequently, the court held that the remedy expressly provided
was permissive, but not exclusive. See Bifano v. Young, 665 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Fort Worth court of appeals has held similarly.
See Ryan Mortgage Investors v. Fleming-Wood, 650 SW.2d 928, 933 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1983, writ refd n.r.e.) (express remedy not exclusive, buyer could pursue other common law remedies). For further discussion of this point, see supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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chaser's breach. Since penalties and forfeitures are unenforceable, the
purchaser could prevail. The seller would be forced to prove the extent of the actual damages suffered by virtue of the purchaser's breach
in the event the provisions for the seller's retention of the earnest
money are not deemed to establish bona fide liquidated damages. If
the seller is unable to do so, the purchaser would be able to recover
the disputed earnest money deposit and, adding an expensive insult to
compound the already grievous injury inflicted upon the seller, could
also receive attorney's fees.7 2 The seller can conclusively avoid any
dispute as to the reasonableness of the stipulated damages for breach
of the contract 3 by changing the designation of the purchaser's deposit from "earnest money" to "option fee," as the courts will not
entertain challenges to the reasonableness of the bargained-for consideration for the option.7 4 Hopefully, the seller will be able to persuade
the purchaser to agree to this modification by merely expressing solicitude for the purchaser's ability to enforce what is, essentially, an option contract and by reminding the purchaser that this change does
not affect the substance of their bargain, but merely reinforces the
limited liability of the purchaser. This will also underscore that the
decision regarding whether or not to consummate the transaction is
solely at the purchaser's option.
72. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
73. See Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 669, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952) (where damages
stipulated, must be reasonable or not enforceable); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Tri-Cities Constr., 551 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ) (damages fixed

prior to breach are penalty and unenforceable if not "reasonable forecast of just compensation
for the harm . . . caused by the breach"); Brace v. Dante, 466 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1971, no writ) (if provision intended as estimate of damages actually incurred, it

is enforceable).
74. See Griffin v. Bell, 202 S.W. 1034, 1036, 1037-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1918,

writ ref'd). In Griffin, the court held that landowners have the right to convey options on such
terms as they see fit and, further, that the consideration need not be both valuable and adequate. The opinion also states that, "where the consideration is sufficient to be denominated
'valuable,' the courts do not concern themselves with the relative value of the properties exchanged." The opinion does state, however, that the general rule is subject to exceptions, such
"as where the consideration is so grossly out of proportion to the property conveyed as to
shock the conscience." See id. at 1037-38; see also 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

§ 127, at 540, 542 (1963). Professor Corbin states that "consideration in fact bargained for is
not required to be adequate in the sense of equality in value." Corbin also explains that the
enforceability of a promise such as this will seldom be affected unless the non-equivalence of
this consideration is so gross as to indicate fraud or mistake. See id. at 542; see also language
set forth supra text accompanying note 69, which, along with changing the designation of the

purchaser's deposit to an option fee, may help in establishing the earnest money as proper and
valid liquidated damages.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss3/3

28

Ellis and Abramowitz: Contracts as Commodities: Issues and Approaches in Regard to Comm

CONTRACTS AS COMMODITIES

1985]

E. Limitation of Purchaser'sRemedies-The Seller's Perspective
Frequently, as the quidpro quo for the limitation of the purchaser's
liability, the contract will limit the purchaser's recourse against the
seller, with respect to the seller's failure to satisfy conditions precedent to closing, by imposing upon the purchaser a choice between
receiving a refund of his earnest money deposit or accepting such title
as the seller may convey. As discussed previously, the Ryan case underscores the crucial importance to the seller of clearly specifying that
the purchaser is unequivocably barred from pursuing any remedy
with respect to any defect of title in the event that the purchaser elects
to close. 7 - The pertinent provisions should unambiguously declare
that, should the purchaser seek to obtain specific performance, the
seller shall not be obligated to incur any cost or expense to cure any
such defect and that the conveyance by special warranty deed of such
title as the seller then holds is to be the purchaser's sole and exclusive
remedy, so as to preclude any recourse with respect to consequential
or other forms of damages. Since the refund of the earnest money is
not a remedy, but merely restores to the purchaser funds which are
his own, the authors suggest that the seller agree to pay a specified
rate of interest thereon as liquidated damages for seller's breach.
Another aspect of negotiations which a seller should concern himself with is the waiver of protections afforded under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The recently amended section 17.42 of
the DTPA 76 permits waiver of its protections (other than those of
section 17.55A) by "a business consumer with assets of $5 million or
more

. . .

that has knowledge and experience in financial and busi-

ness matters that enable it to evaluate the merits and risks of a transaction and that is not in a significantly disparate bargaining
position." 7 Accordingly, the prudent seller should include in his
contract such a waiver of the protections and remedies afforded under
the DTPA, coupled with the purchaser's warranty, representation,
and certification to the seller that the purchaser meets the DTPA's
waiver criteria. The seller should additionally prohibit any assignment of the contract to any party that fails to both satisfy the waiver
criteria and furnish identical certification to the seller prior to such
75. See Ryan Mortgage Investors v. Fleming-Wood, 650 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
77. See id.
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assignment. In order to remedy any potential DTPA problems, the
authors suggest inclusion in the contract of a provision similar to the
following:
Purchaser hereby represents and warrants to Seller, as a material inducement to Seller to enter into this Contract and consummate the
transaction contemplated hereby, that Purchaser has assets in excess of
$5,000,000. Purchaser hereby waives, to the maximum extent permitted by law, any and all rights, benefits and remedies under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act with respect to this Contract and any matters
pertaining to the transaction contemplated hereby.
In addition, the seller's counsel should always strive to clearly articulate and document what information and representations have
been furnished or made to the purchaser prior to the contract's execution. Counsel should also provide a process for documenting the content and scope of any subsequent information or representations so as
to preclude potential liability under the DTPA, independent of the
seller's contractual liability. Similarly, the contract should unambiguously disclaim any liability for any consequential damages. Seller's
counsel should also remember, in regard to the items of personalty
and fixtures covered by the contract, that express warranties can arise
under section 2.313 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as
adopted by the State of Texas," even though, to the seller's mind, a
"description" of this property in the contract may not be intended to
serve as a warranty or representation. Additionally, implied warran79
ties can arise by virtue of sections 2.314 and 2.315 of the UCC.
Thus, the seller's disclaimers should be suitably "conspicuous" and
78. See id. § 2.313 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1984): Section 2.313 states:
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample
(a) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(1) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(2) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(3) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(b) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal
words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to
be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Id. § 2.313.
79. See id. § 2.314, which states:
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clearly worded so as to satisfy the requirements of section 2.316 of the
UCC. ° Furthermore, when representing the seller in conveyances of
Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade
(a) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2.316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(b) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (1) pass without objection in the
trade under the contract description; and
(2) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and
(3) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(4) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(5) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require;
and
(6) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.
(c) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2.316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id. § 2.314; see also id. § 2.315, which states:
Implied Warranty: Fitnessfor ParticularPurpose
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Id. § 2.315.
80. See id. § 2.316, which states:
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(a) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2.202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonble.
(b) Subject to Subsection (c), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case
of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (b)
(1) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded
by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(2) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is
no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him; and
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raw land or income-producing properties, the authors regularly use
language disclaiming any warranties, in a manner similar to the following provision:
Except as specifically stated in this Contract, Seller hereby specifically
disclaims any warranty, guaranty, or representation, oral or written,
past, present, or future, of, as to, or concerning (i) the nature and condition of the Property, including but not by way of limitation, the water,
soil, and geology, and the suitability thereof and of the Property for any
and all activities and uses which Purchaser may elect to conduct
thereon, (ii) the manner, construction, condition, and state of repair or
lack of repair of any improvements located thereon, (iii) except for any
warranties contained in the Deed, the nature and extent of any right-ofway, lease, possession, lien, encumbrance, license, reservation, condition or otherwise, and (iv) the compliance of the Property or its operation with any laws, rules, ordinances, or regulations of any government
or other body. The sale of the Property as provided for herein is made
on an "as is" basis, and Purchaser expressly acknowledges that, in consideration of the agreements of Seller herein, except as otherwise specified herein, Seller makes no warranty or representation, express or
implied, or arising by operation of law, including, but in no way limited
to, any warranty of condition, habitability, merchantability, or fitness
for a particular purpose of the property.
Seller's attorney should be aware that, as article 5545 prohibits limitation of the period in which to bring suit to a period under two years,
limiting the "survival" of representations and warranties to a lesser
period may, ironically, extend them to the four year limitations period
applicable to suits for breach of contract, unless the survival limitation is precisely worded to avoid such effect."1

(3) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or
course of performance or usage of trade.
(d) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions
of this chapter on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of
remedy (Sections 2.718 and 2.719).
(e) The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to the
furnishing of human blood, blood plasma, or other human tissue or organs from a blood
bank or reservoir of such other tissues or organs. Such blood, blood plasma or tissue or
organs shall not for the purpose of this Title be considered commodities subject to sale or
barter, but shall be considered as medical services.
(f) The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness do not apply to the sale of or
barter of livestock or its unborn young.
Id. § 2.316.
81. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5527, 5545 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1985).
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Enhancing the Marketability of the Contract

A purchaser contemplating selling his rights under the contract to
another party, or securing third party financing for his purchase,
should ensure that the seller furnishes a current title commitment
with legible copies of all referenced title objections, an adequate current survey, and all other relevant information as soon as possible.
The purchaser should also insist that the contract provide for suitably
lengthy review and inspection periods which expire a reasonable time
after all relevant information and materials have been secured. The
contract should provide a suitable process for determining the commencement and expiration of review, inspection, and contingency periods, as well as for ascertaining the date for closing, because, as
previously noted, strict compliance with the terms of any option is
required. Such a provision will enable the purchaser to provide potential assignees or the potential lender with the necessary information in order to induce them to purchase his interest in the contract or
make the loan for its acquisition. The purchaser will thereby be afforded sufficient time in which to conduct negotiations and consummate the sale of his interest as purchaser under the contract or the
loan to acquire the property.
V1.

CONCLUSION

The contracts discussed in this article afford their draftsman the
opportunity to employ his imagination and creativity to achieve his
client's goals, and thereby ensure to his client the optimum measure
of protection available consistent with those ends. To fully achieve
these objectives and prevent unanticipated adverse consequences to
his client, the attorney must draft and review contracts with sensitivity to, and awareness of, the legal implications which arise from the
limitations imposed upon the parties' remedies and the resulting impediments to the realization of his client's goals which may arise.
Although most transactions do not engender lawsuits, the authors believe that clients are best served when their attorneys strive to draft
their contracts so as to accurately embody the terms of the transaction and enable the parties to enforce and enjoy the benefits of their
bargain.
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